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The Pearson Report: Guidelines For Canada?*
EDWARD VEITCH**
This essay seeks to examine the Pearson Report on civil liability and 
compensation for personal injury and compare its recommendations 
with the most recent developments pursued by judges in our courts.
The subject of damages for personal injury is an area o f the law which 
cries out for legislative reform .1
The Pearson Report is of immediate interest for Canadian law 
reformers who have turned their minds afresh to the forms of the law 
of damages and to the reform of the tort system generally in light of 
the pleas for change by the Justices of the Supreme Court o f Canada 
in the important decisions of 1978. As one such party the writer, 
prior to reading Pearson, attended a symposium at the University of 
Calgary2 to consider, amongst other things, these major judgm ents of 
January 19th, 1978. This not only fully lived up to its promise of being 
a tort-compensation schemes bazaar to outdo the juristic event dreamt 
of by Professor Twining,3 but also served to prove the fallacy of 
Professor Posner’s belief that in the market place of ideas the well- 
leavened must necessarily prevail over the half-baked.4 In Calgary the 
old protagonists lobbed at each other their predictable salvoes. In order, 
the Honourable Sir Owen Woodhouse reminisced on a job well done,5 
while in response Mr. Justice Laycraft6 doggedly, but skillfully, defended
*The Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury (H.M.S.O. 
Cmnd. 7054-1. 1978).
**M.A., 1963, LL.B., 1966 (Edinburgh). Professor, Faculty o f Law, University o f Windsor. Dean 
Designate at University o f New Brunswick Law School.
1Andrews, v. Grand (if Toy Alberta Ltd. (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 452, at 458 per Dickson J; Thornton v. Board 
of School Trustees, Prince George (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 480; Arnold v. Teno (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 609; 
and Keizer v. Hanna (1978), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 449. And see Charles, ‘Justice in Personal Injury Awards; 
The Continuing Search for Guidelines', Studies m Canadian Tort Law (ed. Klar 1977), 37; Gibson, 
Repairing the Law of Damages, (1978) 8 Man. L.J. 637, and Veitch, Bill 59 and the Reform of Fatal Accidents 
Legislation, (1978) 10 Ottawa L. R. 114; Charles, A New Handbook on the Assessment of Damages
m Personal Injury Cases from The Supreme Court of Canada, (1978) 3 C.C.L.T. 344; Bissett-Johnson, Comment, 
(1978) 24 McGill L.J. 316.
‘T h e  Future o f Personal Injury Compensation’, presented by the Faculty of Law, January 20-21, 1978. 
*Twining, The Juristic Bazaar, (1978) 15 S.P.T.L.J. 70.
4Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2nd ed. 1977), Ch. 28.
•Report of Royal Commission of Inquiry, Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand (December
1967).
‘Laycraft, Reforming the Automobile Tort System, (1971) Alberta L. Rev. 22.
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the tort system with his proposals for more judges and a tariff scale 
for injury compensation. T hereafter Professor Rueben Hasson,7 
with eccentric hum our, once again exposed the tort system which piovoked 
Mr. Ted Rachlin Q.C.,8 to do his best to defend the record of the 
swashbuckling trial lawyers who, by their courage, take on the large 
corporations and both achieve justice for their clients and establish 
socially beneficial standards of conduct by their courtroom successes.9
In an after-dinner speech Professor Jeffrey O’Connell10 punched 
out some hard-nosed advice, based on his many years of experience, 
on how to push a compensation scheme through a legislature. At the 
same time he castigated the neanderthal defenders of the existing system 
in a barbed address. Another veteran, Professor Ison, who has long 
ago given up even a peremptory attack on the tort system,11 lectured 
the participants on his new plan for income security for those suffering 
from the incidents o f m odern living.12 In closing, Professor Allen 
Linden Q.C., now Mr. Justice Linden of the Ontario Supreme Court, 
offered his longstanding misgivings on the abolition of the tort system.13
T hat gathering followed the patte*..« of many held in the last decade 
at which able and sincere speakers, some in favour of the tort system 
and others dedicated to its abolition, have brayed at or near each other 
but rarely, if ever, have communicated. And this is to be expected 
because as every advocate knows, while it is almost impossible to reverse 
totally the opinion of an opponent, a compromise position is always 
possible.14
It is that compromise which is offered by Pearson:
O ur compensation systems should be looked at as a whole. T ort should be 
retained and, while the two systems of tort and social security should continue 
side by side, the relationship between them should be significantly altered.
Social security should be recognized as the principal means of compensation. 
Double compensation should be avoided by offsetting social security benefits
THasson, Blood Feuds, Writs and Rifles, (1976) 14 Osgixide Hall L. J. 445; Glasbeek 8c Hasson, ‘Fault — 
T he Great Hoax’, New Studies in Canadian Tort Law (ed. Klar 1977), 395.
*Of Rachlin, Wolfson 8c Malach, Toronto. Mr. Rachlin is chairman of the Insurance Committee, The 
Advocates Society o f Ontario.
*Contra: Scheingold, The Myth of Rights (Yale U.P. 1974), at 124-6.
"(Connell, The Interlocking Death and Rebirth of Contract and Tort, (1977) 75 Mich. L. Rev. 659, citing the 
author's m ajor contributions.
"Ison , ‘H um an Disability and Personal Income’, New Studies in Canadian Tort Law (ed. Klar 1977), 425.
'Mson, The Politics of Reform in Personal Injury Compensation, (1977) 27 U. Toronto L. J. 385.
l3Linden, Peaceful Co-existence and Automobile Accident Compensation, (1966) 9 Can. Bar J. 5.
14T he political realities in the decision-making were accurately diagnosed by Lewis, Watting for Pearson: 
The Policy Choices to be Made m Accident Compensation, (1978) 12 The Law Teacher I.
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in the assessment of tort damages. Money available should be spent on the 
more serious injuries rather on minor injuries. T he range of those receiving 
compensation should be extended.
No-fault compensation should be introduced for motor vehicle injuries. The 
no-fault provision for work injuries should be improved. A new benefit for 
all severely handicapped children should be introduced.
T he range of tort should be extended by introducing strict liability in some 
areas. U nder tort, provision should be made for periodic payments for 
pecuniary loss.
In administering compensation existing systems and institution should be 
used, but considerable simplification o f the highly complicated social security 
system is desirable.
O ur terms of reference do not cover all injuries, and at least one million 
injuries every year, mostly those occurring in the home, would remain outside 
our proposals.1*
That quotation accurately summarizes the Commission’s achieve­
ments whose limited nature restricts commentary to detail and obviates 
wider criticism of the policy choices m ade.16 Accordingly, this appreciation 
seeks to examine the substantive recommendations offered by sixteen 
persons17 who dedicated five years of their lives18 and incurred expenses 
of approximately $2,700,00019 in the examination of the causes and 
compensation of human disability. O ur question must be, not what did 
the British taxpayers get for their investment, but what, if anything, 
can we in Canada gain from this Report?
T he policy statement reveals the choice to retain the pre-existing 
tort system, albeit with cosmetic improvements, and to add to it two 
no-fault schemes, one for motor vehicle injuries and a second for 
severely handicapped children, howsoever handicapped. At the same 
time the commissioners called for a rationalization of the existing 
compensation schemes for disablement through injury, disease or other 
incident. This half-way house will please neither the rabid abolitionist 
nor the dyed-in-the-wool retentionist of the tort system, but it may 
be the only acceptable political choice for this era of continuing fiscal 
conservatism.
“ Pearson, supra, at 367.
“ Lewis, supra, footnote 14; Weir, Note [1978] C.L.J. 222, at 226. Criticism of specific proposals is easy 
enough. T he difficulty in appraising the Report as a whole is that it really isn't a whole at all — it is a 
congeries o f those ideas which managed to collect a majority o f voices in a Commission whose 
members displayed very diverse attitudes, ranging from intuitive humanity to dogmatic sophistication. 
The result is extremely English, but the two volumes o f supporting data will be very useful.
ITPearson, supra, at iii and v.
“ March 13, 1973 to March 1978.
“ Pearson, supra, at ii: £1,337,446 o f which £50,546 was spent on the cost of printing and publishing of 
the Report.
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In this examination o f the Report the order of presentation follows 
that of the document itself.
THE IMPROVEMENT AND RATIONALIZATION OF THE TORT 
SYSTEM
The Commission fixed on two main ideas: to make it easier for the 
victim to recover, and to sort out the wrinkles in the assessment, 
calculation and adjudication process of the award of compensation. 
Firstly, to answer the complaint that the tort system compensates solely 
on the basis o f chance and luck, the members recommended that 
strict liability be imposed with respect to injuries caused by products 
and rail transport, by vaccine damage, by injury to volunteers for 
medical research, and in relation to injuries resulting from things and 
operations involving exceptional risks.20
This may be a genuine contribution, particularly with regard to 
products, for as John Fleming has suggested:
Liability for defective products (or for short ‘products liability’) is not yet a 
coherent concept of our law. The present pattern of legal rules is an amalgam 
o f contract and tort, o f strict liability and negligence. It affords greater 
protection to the buyer against the retail seller than to accident victims 
against the manufacturer. It still places legalistic concepts like privity of 
contract before functional policies of compensation, accident prevention and 
loss spreading. But reform is in the air. While our courts have evidently 
been unequal to the task, there is now a good prospect o f early legislative 
intervention.21
The idea of special responsibility for products dates from the mid­
nineteenth century, but it only really developed in the twentieth century 
with the imposition of liability on the m anufacturers of foodstuffs and 
automobiles. The underlying policies comprise the alleviation of the 
burden of proof on the victim, the spreading of the losses associated 
with accidents amongst all of the consumers and the recognition of the 
deterrence factor of increasing insurance premiums on m anufacturers 
of dangerous products.22
’•Pearson, supra, at 368, at 382-387.
‘ ‘Fleming, The Law of Torts (5th ed.), at 498, footnotes omitted. And compare Waddams, Products 
Liability (1974).
"Defective services command similar consequences. As a result o f rising frequency of suits against law 
firms in the Province o f Ontario the Law Society o f U pper Canada has had to accept an increase in the 
errors and omissions premium from $275 in 1977-78 to $450 for the year 1978-79. Recent cases have 
included: Major v. Buchanan (1975), 61 D.L.R. (3d) 46; Gouzenko v. Harris (i976), 1 C.C.L.T. 37; Messmeo 
v. Beak (1977), 13 O R. (2d) 329; and Banks v. Reid (1978), 18 O.R. (2d) 148.
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W hether the recommendation of Pearson will achieve these goals 
must be questioned in the light o f North American experience. It has 
been established that strict liability is not absolute liability so that in 
order to succeed the victim must show that the product was defective 
in form and unreasonably dangerous to the user. There have been 
disputes as to whether the plaintiff must establish one or both of these 
allegations. And indeed it has sometimes been argued that the consumer 
must prove that the product is harmful because there was something 
inherently wrong with it. That is, that the manner of design was at 
fault or there was a defect in the process o f manufacture. At the same 
time considerable energies have been spent on determining whether 
or not the term ‘defective’ encompasses all o f the three above. Equally 
the phrase ‘unreasonably dangerous’ has been held to mean ultra- 
hazardous, or abnormally dangerous or merely that the product caused 
injury. The exploration of the synonyms unsafe, harmful, injurious 
and unwholesome has made fortunes for some law firms. Further 
litigation has not cleared up the question who is covered by the responsi­
bility of the m anufacturer or supplier: the purchaser, the user or the 
bystander? O ther unanswered queries are: is the liability of the m anu­
facturer opened in time?23 Is he liable only if notified within a certain 
number of days of defects in the product and can he successfully 
disclaim responsibility by the use of exculpatory clauses or by the use 
of the defences of abuse of product or consumer stupidity?
Therefore the contribution of the Commission is limited to that of 
nudging the judiciary along a path which they are already slowly 
traversing. There can be little doubt that the acceptance of the proposal 
will encourage rather than diminish litigation, and the social costs may 
be considerable. That is to say, when a California jury in 1978 awarded 
$127.8 million dollars (reduced on appeal to $6.8 million dollars) for 
injuries suffered when a Ford Pinto fuel tank exploded following a rear 
end collision the public debate in the United States over the costs of 
products liability to the consumer reopened with renewed vigour. 
The consumers there are reacting to the fact that the price paid for 
items that are identified as high risk-bearing includes a portion of the 
m anufacturer’s liability insurance premiums. While the larger corpora­
tions can usually obtain liability insurance the smaller firms are forced 
to go without due to their inability to afford the costs and because the 
alternative, that of ceasing operations, is for them unacceptable.
Yet one successful plaintiff s claim of substantial proportions against 
the firm “going bare” may have that effect and so put 50 or 100 workers 
out of work. Faced with these problems the trend in the United States
“ Compare section 6 (4) of the draft Limitations Act of Ontario (Ministry o f the Attorney General, 
September, 1977): "The running o f time with respect to the limitation period fixed by this Act for an 
action to which the subsection applies is postponed and does not commence to run against a plaintiff 
until he knows, or in all the circumstances o f the case, he ought to know, (a) the identity of the 
defendant; and (b) the facts upon which his action is founded.”
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has been to resort to legislation to codify the varying common law 
decisions and so to give the insurance industry some basis for calculating 
their potential liabilities. This has been necessary because the insurance 
corporations have been raising premiums by as much as 1,500 per cent 
over the last few years on the premise that they have been forced 
to insure against the unknown. Therefore some 42 states are currently 
considering the enactment of products liability statutes which their 
backers hope will make the law more certain and place a ceiling on 
insurance premiums.
These problematic possibilities clearly were not considered in depth 
prior to the drafting of the recommendations of the Commission.
RATIONALIZATION OF THE AWARD OF DAMAGES
The second branch o f the new and improved tort system is perceived 
by the Commission to lie in the rationalization of the awarding of 
damages. The basic principle of full reparation for loss sustained is 
upheld but the method of assessment and m anner of payment are to be 
revised. Thus double compensation is to be avoided by deducting 
from damages all monies received through the social security system. 
Periodic payments are to be introduced for financial loss sustained, 
but with the option of a lump sum remaining. The incidence of 
income tax and inflation are to be considered in the assessment of the 
damages claimed. T here is nothing strikingly original here and the 
detailed recommendations on the assessment of damages read very 
much like a synopsis o f the academic writing on damages since the 
early 1960’s throughout the common law world.
Damages for services rendered and renderable
The question of recovery for services given to an injured person 
by another has universally concerned the courts over recent years.24 
Pearson now clarifies the position by recommending that damages be 
recoverable without technical restriction and that the measure be that of 
the need of the recipient. Experience in Canada shows that the value 
may be calculated either by reference to the market price of such 
services25 or by using an evaluation based on the input of the class 
of donor to the gross national product.26 Further the Supreme Court
“ See clause 4, T he Law Commission (No. 56) Report on Personal Injury Utxgatum — Assessment of 
Damages (1973) which attempted to deal with the problems raised by Schneider v. Eismntch (I960), 2 Q.B. 
430 and Gage v. King (1961), 1 Q.B. 188 and intensified by Cunningham v. Harrison (1973), Q.B. 942, 
Donnelly v. Joyce (1973), 3 All E.R. 475. And see Gibson, supra, footnote 1, at 659-660.
uHasson v. Hamel (1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 517.
u Franco v. Woolfe (1974), 6 O.R. (2d) 227.
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of Canada in Thornton and Teno adopted the long defunct notion of 
Lord Denning M.R.27 of awarding monies to the plaintiff to be held in 
trust for the donor third party.
Conversely, where the injured person is deprived o f the opportunity 
o f giving services to his relatives his loss of capacity is compensable in 
damages. This concept has links with the Scots law of solatium by 
which relatives of the deceased recover for their loss of possible services 
from the deceased,28 but principally derives from the 150 years of 
juridical interpretation o f Lord Campbell’s Act in its various guises.29 
What we are seeing here is the recognition of the hitherto unarticulated 
notion of compensating a nuclear family for an intrusion by a money 
assessment of the intangible harm so sustained.30 This must also be the 
basis for the Commission’s recommendation that an award of loss of 
society be made available in the awkward cases of the deaths o f minor 
children and non-earning spouses whose loss was difficult to quantify 
under the purely financial calculation of the 19th Century legislation.31 
But for us the old ‘St. Lawrence Rule’32 already went beyond the 
restricted idea of pecuniary loss attributable to the death of the deceased 
by a second head of damages for the loss of guidance, example, 
encouragement, training and education provided by the deceased. 
This latter day legal fiction was developed to meet the limitations of the 
original Lord Campbell’s Act although the extensions of the fiction have 
been slow to gain acceptance. There still remain questions as to whether 
the head of damages only applies to the loss of a mother and not the 
loss o f a father and whether children alone can be the beneficiaries.
Loss of Amenity33
T he giving of money for loss of enjoyment of life has always 
provoked charges against the tort system of intuitive decision making 
and guess work as to the imponderable. The Commission, having 
made the decision to continue and enlarge the range o f awards for
11Dennis v. London Passenger Transport Board, [1948] 1 All E.R. 779,
**Veitch, Solatium — A Debt Repaidf (1972), 7 Ir. Ju r. 77.
**Now the Fattil Accidents Act 1976, C. 30.
s*Family Law Reform Act 1978 (Statutes of Ont. 1978 c. 2), s. 60 (2) (d).
*' Veitch, supra, footnote 1, at 118.
**Sf. Lawrence (if Ottawa R. Co. v. Lett (1885), 11 S.C.R. 422; Vana v. Tosta, [1968] S.C.R. 71; Trudel v. 
Canamerican Auto Lease and Rental Ltd. (1975), 59 D.L.R. (3d) 344; Franco v. Woolfe (1976), 69 D.L.R. (3d) 
501; Clement v. Leslies Storage Ltd. (1978), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 469; Lewis v. Todd (1978), 5 C.C.L.T. 
167, 170 ff. per Lacourciere J. A. dissenting.
**Ogus, Damage for Lost Amentttes: For a Foot, a Feeling or a Function, (1972) 35 Mod. L.R. 1.
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intangible losses, rejected a tariff scale and gave its approval to lump 
sum awards for such losses. The controversy over compensation for 
intrusion of sexual capacity comprehensively illustrates the problems.34
Pain and Suffering
An important paper by O’Connell and Simon35 revealed that 70 
per cent of the injured persons interviewed did not realize that pain 
and suffering was compensable and so did not expect any money. 
The proponents of compensation schemes have consequently railed 
against such payments as being the very proof of the irrationality of 
the tort system and have resisted, unsuccessfully, the addition of these 
awards to their schemes.36
The Pearson Commission favours retaining lump sum payments for 
pain and suffering but the members split equally as to the setting 
of ceilings for the awards.
By way of comparison the Supreme Court of Canada in January of 
197 837 attacked this problem of ceilings for pain and suffering and 
decided upon an arbitrary Figure of $100,000. The Justices accepted 
that there is an injury comprising mental anguish flowing from the 
realization of the injury and that this is a necessary consequence of 
the physical harm. But they also observed that awards have been 
increasing as courts have laid emphasis on the subjective appreciation 
of the plaintiffs injury rather than attempt to assess an award which 
would be fair as between both plaintiff and defendant and all others 
similarly injured. The members of the court also spoke to the social 
burden of increasing insurance costs38 in order to justify their decision 
to limit awards under this heading. What the Supreme Court did not 
tell us was how to operate these ceilings. For example, is the ceiling 
price to apply to the very worst case imaginable with a scaling down of 
awards pertinent to lesser injuries? O r should the trial judge assess 
the damages as before then reduce his assessment to the maximum? 
What factors should go into the assessment — severity, characteristics
"V. V. C. (1972), 26 D.L.R. (3d) 527, and Megtio v. Kaufman Lumber Ltd. (1978), 79 D.L.R. (3d) 104. 
s*Payment for Pam and Suffering — who wants what, when and whyf (1972) U. 111. L.F.I.
"Palm er, Compensation for Personal Injury: A Requum for the Common Law m New Zealand, (1973) 21 Am.
J.C.L. 1.
3''Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd.; Thornton v. The Board of School Trustees o f School District No. 57 and 
Arnold v. Teno, supra, footnote 1. And compare similar attempts in the United States: Temple v. Liberty 
Mutual 336 So. 2d 299 (La. App. 1978) where the court set conventional limits o f $40,000 for intangible 
losses to surviving spouses and $30,000 to each surviving child.
"Conversely, at least one trial judge has expressed the opinion that the new scheme o f overall 
calculation ol damages approved by the Supreme Court o f Canada has served to increase awards 
considerably — Cole v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. (1978), 22 N.B.R. (2d) 328, at 342 per Barry J.
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of the individual, length o f time of expected suffering, and what else? 
In addition there was no direction given as to if and when the ceiling 
ought to be modified to cope with the devaluation o f the dollar.3®
Also it should be said that the awards of trial and appellate courts 
in Canada,40 at least, may often be disguised payments to relatives of 
disastrously injured persons whom they will have to care for indefinitely. 
The aim of assistance with the meeting o f staggering legal costs cannot 
be overlooked.41
The Unconscious Plaintiff
The Commission’s views represent a reversal of the existing English 
rule42 by which substantial damages are given to an unconscious injured 
person. Commonwealth jurisdictions, such as Australia and Canada, 
did not accept that metropolitan rule but in Canada at least we have 
not proceeded without difficulty. Most recently the Alberta Court of 
Appeal43 made a plea for assistance from the Supreme Court of 
Canada in dealing with a conscious plaintiff unaware o f her condition. 
The judgm ents reiterate all o f the pertinent arguments. By majority 
the court determined that the prevailing principle should be moderation 
of damages and that an artificial ceiling o f $50,000 should be set. 
Nevertheless the judgm ents reveal the judicial unhappiness with their 
solution to the problem. That is, the court argued that the problem 
really is one of philosophy rather than law and that the traditional 
explanations of damages awards do not apply in these cases. The 
judges recognized that money cannot provide a benefit for this class 
of injured persons especially where all medical benefits are State- 
provided, and that punishment o f the wrong-doer is irrelevant where 
compulsory insurance is a fact and where there exists a state fund to 
provide for monies not collectable from an insurer. They questioned 
the justification for granting a large sum of money to the particular 
plaintiff just because she happened to be a victim of a motor vehicle 
accident, and in so doing reviewed the provisions for persons injured 
in industry, by a criminal act, and on active service with the arm ed forces. 
They concluded that as other victims would merely receive monthly
**There arc other jurisdictions where such ceilings are employed. In Ireland a statutory figure of 
£1,000 is set for intangible losses suffered by dependants o f a deceased, which figure has become the 
routine award. By comparison, in Scotland a conventional figure set by the courts for similar losses has 
been increased regularly to cope with the devaluing pound. See Veitch, supra, footnote 28 at 90-93. Compare 
Ltndal v. Lmdal (1978), 5 C.C.L.T. 224, which overrides the ceiling.
**Teno v. Arnold, 7 O.R. (2d) 276, afTd, 11 O.R. (2d) 585.
41 In the United States courts routinely award attorneys’ fees in addition to compensatory and punitive 
damages: Ponce de Leon Ctmdomtntums v. De Girolamo (1977) 232 S.E. 2d 62.
**Wise v. Kaye (1962), 1 Q.B. 638; West v. Shephard, [1964] A.C. 326.
“Hamel v. Prather, [1975] 2 W.W.R. 681; (1976), 2 W.W.R. 742.
28 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL
pensions with hospital care at public expense there was sparse justification 
for granting a massive lump sum payment to this particular individual. 
The Commission and the judges would therefore appear to be arriving 
at the similar conclusion, by comparable analysis and by acceptance o f 
the same value judgments.
Wrongful Death
U nder this heading the members recommend the extension of the 
class o f relatives who may claim damages for the loss of one of their 
num ber by the adoption of the recent consolidation of the Scots law.44 
This however does not cover the common law spouse whose right to 
recovery has been accepted elsewhere45 in a deliberate attempt to 
rationalize the classes of persons entitled to recover under both the tort 
and social security systems. As the common law wife does not recover 
under the British social security then the policy of rationalization is 
seen to prevail over ideas of justice. However in view of the num ber 
of persons living in relationships outside o f legal m arriage46 the more 
expanded definition of spouse adopted in Ontario copes with such relation­
ships o f affinity. The new class includes:
60.—(1) Where a person is injured or killed by the fault or neglect of 
another under circumstances where the person is entitled to recover damages, 
or would have been entitled if not killed, the spouse, as defined in Part II, 
children, grandchildren, parents, grandparents, brothers and sisters o f the 
person are entitled to recover their pecuniary loss resulting from the injury 
or death from the person from whom the person injured or killed is entitled 
to recover or would have been entitled if not killed, and to maintain an 
action for the purpose in a court o f competent jurisdiction. (Family Law 
Reform Act (Ont. 1978).
Even this new list does not recognize the dependancy interests of such 
as fiancees,47 the de facto separated spouse48 and other close relations 
and others living within the deceased’s household and wholly or partly 
supported by him.49
44Damages (Scotland) Act, (1976 C. 13) Schedule I.
4tT he Family Law Reform Act, 1978 (Ont.) ss. 1 (f). 14 (b) and 60.
4'I n  Ontario, with a population o f approximately eight million in 1973, the num ber was estimated to be 
one quarter o f a million spouses living apart, o f which num ber two thirds were separated and not 
divorced, and many living with other partners. T he num ber of single persons living in extra-marital 
relationships is believed to be sizeable.
*7Cume v. Wardrop 1927, S.C. 538 in which the fiancee recovered for nervous shock caused by 
witnessing injury to the prospective groom.
4*Lerman v. MacLean (1978), 6 Alberta L. Rev. (2d) 68; accord: Davies v. Taylor, [1974] A.C. 207.
**Hopkms v. McFarland (1976), 15 O.R. (2d) 330.
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Remarriage and Divorce
The Commission disagrees with the policy o f section 4 o f the Law 
Reform (Misc. Provs.) Act o f 197 150 which provides that in assessing 
damages for loss o f dependancy no account should be taken of a widow’s 
remarriage or her prospect thereof. Logically, the Commission suggests 
that the court should be permitted to take into account the marriage 
of the bereaved prior to the trial but should not speculate either as 
to the future remarriage prospects of the survivor or as to the possi­
bilities of divorce51 between the deceased and the survivor prior to the 
accident. This still leaves open the fact of remarriage between trial 
and appeal.52
If the overriding purpose of these recommendations is to make more 
accurate the damages calculation then surely remarriage and divorce 
factors are readily ascertainable from national statistics53 on which 
annuity calculations are uniformly based. The availability o f such tables 
reduces the weight of the arguments of the Supreme Court of Canada, 
upholding the views of the trial judge, that no significance can be 
attached to such guesswork.54
Collateral Benefits55
Which benefits are and which are not to be taken account of in the 
assessment of damages has until now provided some judges, lawyers 
and some law teachers with their reason for living. Both in England,56 
and more recently in Ontario,57 attempted clarification by legislation 
has not been convincing, while over the same period the English58
&#See Fleming, The Law of Torts (5th ed.), at 653-654.
“ Judges have unanimously rejected attempts by defence counsel to argue the prior instability of the 
marriage between the plaintiff and the deceased: Plachta v. Richardson (1975), 4 O.R. (2nd) 654.
”Mercer v. Stjan (1977), 14 O.R. (3d) 12.
“ Measuring Marriage Prospects, (1971) 45 A.L.J. 114 and 160. Compare Julian v. Nor & Central Gas 
Corp. (1978), 5C .C .L.T . 148.
**Keizer v. Hanna, supra, footnote 1, at 460. At trial (see (1975), 7 O.R. (2d) 327, at 334) the judge 
observed honestly:
On the question o f the widow's prospects o f remarriage my discerning eye provokes me 
to rate same highly but 1 am loath to attach much weight to this impression because of 
the apt comments o f Phillimore J. in Buckley v. Allen and Ford (Oxford), L td, (1967] 1 All
E.R. 539.
“ Cooper, A Collateral Benefits Prtnctple, (1971) 49 Can. B. Rev. 501; Charles, "Justice in Personal Injury 
Awards", Studies in Canadian Tort Law (ed. Klar 1977) 37, 74 fT.
‘•The Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act 1948, s. 2 (1), (11 & 12 Geo. 6 c. 41).
,TT he Family Law Reform Act, s.o. (1978) c. 2.
%*Parry v. Cleaver, [1970] A.C. 1; Datsh v. Wauton (1972), 1 Q.B. 262.
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and Commonwealth59 judges have been no more successful in their 
individual efforts at rationalization.
And likewise in Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada has 
determined that while income tax is an irrelevant consideration for 
personal injuries awards,60 it is a proper deduction in the assessment 
of dependants claims in a wrongful death action.61 At the same time 
the courts have held that the Canada Pension Plan,62 registered savings 
plans and pension refunds63 on death of the deceased cannot be said 
to be benefits accruing by reason o f the death o f the deceased. Yet 
despite the broad dicta of the Ontario Court of Appeal64 in regard to 
contracts of insurance, judges across the country continue to struggle 
with pension benefits,65 foreign welfare benefits66 and no-fault in­
surance payments.67
The Commission has tried to tidy things up by proposing that the 
full value of social security benefits payable to an injured person or his 
dependants as a result of an injury for which damages are awarded 
should be deducted in the assessment of damages. Benefits to be taken 
into account are those payable to the plaintiff as a result of the injury 
which rationally excludes state retirement pensions, child benefit and 
maternity benefits. As before, payments received under contracts of 
insurance, occupational disability pensions and charitable aid are to be 
disregarded.
The fine arguments in the Report on these problems particularly 
remind the reader that here, as throughout much of the Report, the 
Commission appears to have usurped the role of the English Law 
Commission.
Moreover, the conclusions are not startling for the Canadian 
reader, since some of the provinces have made considerable efforts to
‘•Fleming, supra, footnote 50, at 224-231 and 656-658.
%tThe Queen v. Jennings, [1966] S.C..R. 532.
*'Keiier v. Hanna, supra, footnote 1.
**Canadtan Pacific Ltd. v. Gill, [1973] S.C.R. 654.
E lem ent v. Leslies Storage Ltd. (1978), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 469.
**Boarelli v. Flannigan (1973), 36 D.L.R. (3d) 4, now codified in section 64 (1) of the Family Law Reform 
Act, 1978.
*lKrause v. Davey, [1971] 2 O.R. 670, 18 D.L.R. (3d) 674; Plachta v. Richardson, 4 O.R. (2d) 654, 49 
D.L.R. (3d) 23; Bates v. IUerbum, 8 O.R. (2d) 467, 58 D.L.R. (3d) 339, varied on other grounds, 12 O.R. 
(2d) 721, and compare Spurr v. Naugher, 11 N.S.R. (2d) 637, 50 D.L.R. (3d) 105.
**Pollmgton v. Air-DaU ImL, [1968] 1 O.R. 747, 67 D.L.R. (2d) 565.
*TMilane v. Harty, 7 O.R. (2d) 241; Gorrie v. Gill 9 O.R. (2d) 73, 59 D.L.R. (3d) 481: approved by the 
Supreme Court o f Canada in Keiur v. Hanna, Supra, footnote 1 at 453.
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meet the problems by legislative change. The Province o f New Brunswick 
provides one example:
7 In assessing damages in an action brought under this Act there shall not 
be taken into account:
(a) any sum paid or payable on the death of the deceased under any contract 
o f insurance or assurance, whether made before or after the coming into 
force of this Act;
(b) any premium that would have been payable in future under any contract 
of insurance or assurance if the deceased had survived;
(c) any benefit or right to benefits, resulting from the death of the deceased, 
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, or the Social Welfare Act, or the Child 
Welfare Act or under any other Act that is enacted by any legislature, parlia­
ment, or other legislative authority and that is o f similar import or effect;
(d) any pension, annuity or other periodical allowance accruing payable by 
reason of the death of the deceased;
(e) any amount that may be recovered under any statutory provision creating 
a special right to bring an action for the benefit of persons for whose benefit 
an action may be brought under this Act.®8
The Form of Damages
The main recommendation is that damages for future pecuniary 
loss caused by death or serious injury should take the form of periodic 
payments. This is aimed at the criticisms of the tort system that lump 
sum calculations require a present prediction of the unknowable future 
loss after the m anner of a long-range weather forecast. The payments 
are supposed to replace the real need of the plaintiff for future income 
but this proposal must obviously withstand the human desire for 
capitalized damages which alone can be transform ed into the pipe- 
dream .89
The matter o f variation is to be dealt with by limiting review to 
alterations in the injured person’s financial losses caused by the changes 
in his medical condition. The prem ature death of the injured party 
gives an action to the dependants for their lost dependancy. In contrast, 
damages for non-financial loss are to continue to be awarded in lump 
sum form.
"Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. F-7, s. 7.
**Fleming, Damages: Capital or Rent, (1968), 19 U. Toronto L. J. 295.
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Clearly the recommendations merit serious consideration,70 but only 
in comparison with the systems adopted in New Zealand71 and Quebec72 
and with regard to the years of practice of our own workers’ com­
pensation schemes. In New Zealand the loss of earning capacity is 
calculated on the basis of the pre-tax earnings of the claimant with 
the periodical payment being eighty per cent of that figure, the payment 
itself remaining taxable. Where the individual does not make a total 
recovery then the payments continue at eighty per cent of perm anent 
loss of earning capacity. In only exceptional cases are these payments 
commuted into a lump sum payment. In the event of death the wholly 
dependant surviving spouse receives payments equal to naif o f the 
compensation which would have been payable to the deceased had he 
survived but been totally unable to earn. A child is entitled to one 
sixth of that figure. U nder the Quebec scheme weekly benefits by way 
of income indemnity replacement are payable on the calculation of the 
victim’s net income up to a maximum of $18,000 dollars gross income. 
The deductions include income tax, unemployment insurance con­
tributions, contributions to the Quebec Pension Plan and those made 
under the Health Insurance Act. Where the victim dies the dependants 
are entitled to compensation based on that which the victim would 
have received had he survived but totally incapacitated. The dependants’ 
entitlement is based on the scale of sixty-five per cent for one dependant, 
seventy-five per cent for two dependants plus five per cent for each 
other dependant up to a maximum of ninety per cent.
The Calculation of Damages
With the exception of the full deduction of the relevant social 
security benefits the Commission recommends the retention o f the calcula­
tion of damages by the time-honoured judicial hunch quantified by the 
multiplier and dressed up in catchy algebraic formulae.
The controversy over the incidence of taxation73 is to be resolved 
by basing periodic payments for future pecuniary loss on the gross
T#Dickson J. in Andrews, supra, footnote 1, at page 458 pleaded:
The lump-sum award presents problems of great importance. It is subject to inflation, 
it is subject to fluctuation on investment, income from it is subject to tax. After judgm ent 
new needs o f the plaintiff arise and present needs are extinguished; yet, our law of 
damages knows nothing o f periodic payment. The difficulties are greatest where there is 
a continuing need for intensive and expensive care and a long-term loss o f earning 
capacity. It should be possible to devise some system whereby payments would be subject 
to periodic review and variation in the light o f the continuing needs o f the injured 
person and the cost of meeting those needs.
TlAccident Compensation Act, 1972, No. 43.
T,The Quebec Automobile Insurance Act, (Bill 67, 31st Leg. Que., 2nd sess., 1977, effective March 1st, 
1978).
1SB.T.C. v. Gourley, [1956] A.C. 185, contra The Queen v.Jennmgs, [1966] S.C.R. 532. And compare Teno 
v. Arnold (1974), 7 O.R. (3d) 274, at 309, the trial judge increased the provision for future care and 
maintenance because of the inevitability o f increases in the incidence o f taxation.
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equivalent of the net annual loss and rendering the payments as taxable 
earned income to the recipient. The multiplier to be employed in the 
particular case is to be taken from a table constructed to allow for 
inflation of earnings and prices combined with the fluctuation in the 
interest rates.74
That simple British solution is, of course, predicated on the acceptance 
of the periodic payments principle. In the meantime we have managed 
to get ourselves into something of a tangle on both the inflation and 
taxation issues.
As Professor Gibson75 has convincingly shown, the figures chosen 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in the set-off of the estimated 
annual inflation rate against the estimated interest rate on sound invest­
ments were severely prejudicial to the plaintiffs in the calculation of the 
real earning power of the investment o f the appropriate lump-sum 
award. That writer’s conclusion that the burden lies on plaintiffs 
counsel to lead much more detailed and comprehensive evidence as to the 
nature o f interest rates and inflation is inescapable.
Equally with the question of taxation as an element in the quantify­
ing of damages, the judicial record is uneven. The seeming conclusiveness 
of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Jennings76 has crumbled in the 
face of the following questions:
(a) should an award of damages for lost income be subject to income tax,77
(b) should interest earned on damages awards be taxable as income,78
(c) should the investment income from a fund established to provide for future 
medical care be taxable, and
(d) should the possibility of the future increase in the incidence o f taxation 
be an appropriate factor in the assessment of damages awards?78
These vexing questions, the answers to which Pearson provides 
little assistance, fully justify the h in ts . for legislative cure given by 
the Supreme Court of Canada.
74Pearson, supra, at 145. 
u Supra, footnote I, at 648-652.
,tSufna, footnote 60.
,TCf.: Gnouard v. M.N.R., [1977] C.T.C. 2588 cited by Goldstein, The Taxation of Damages, (1978) 
Advocates Quarterly 282, and see that author's views expressed at 300.
7*Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, IT-365, March 21, 1977, paras. 6, 11 to 16.
7tTeno v. Arnold (1974), 7 O.R. (2d) 276, varied 11 O  R. (2d) 585, Lewis v. Todd (1978), 5 C.C.L.T. 167.
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Adjudication
Two, o f many, criticisms of the tort system have been those of 
its administrative costs and the delay in the payment o f compensation. 
The Commission reacts to these, in part, by recommending that 
jury trials, which on average take twice the time of judge trials, 
should not be re-introduced in personal injuries actions. This, to 
some, must be the archetypal “band-aid” remedy.80
In Canada, where jury  trials are rare anyway,81 some provinces, 
as disparate as Alberta and Ontario, have instituted the pre-trial 
settlement procedure with some success. This has been taken a step 
further by the State of Michigan in which a trial judge at any stage 
of the proceedings, with the aid of a second judge brought in for 
the specific purpose, can ‘wood-shed’ the lawyers and so promote a 
settlement with the consent of the parties. Some Michigan Circuit 
judges have claimed not only a seventy per cent success rate but also 
claim not to have heard an automobile running-down case in over 
eighteen months to the date of writing.82
In this same portion o f the Report83 the Commission recommends 
the continuation o f the judicial practice of itemizing awards which 
serves to assist counsel in their decisions whether or not to appeal 
trial judgm ents on quantum , either because o f overlap or under­
estimation of a particular heading of damages.
That this is now the approved practice in Canada is clear from 
the dicta of Mr. Justice Dickson in Andrews:
The method of assessing general damages in separate amounts is a sound one.
It is the only way in which any meaningful review of the award is possible 
on appeal and the only way of affording reasonable guidance in future 
cases. Equally important, it discloses to the litigants and their advisers the 
components of the overall award, thus insuring them that each of the various 
heads of damage going to make up the claim has been given thoughtful 
consideration.*4
••"The time has passed for band-aid remedies like more judges, or small claims arbitration procedures. 
I f  the outlook and motives o f the legal profession are to command the pride and respect o f the public, 
it may be time for a more searching, less self-interested response to the calls for personal injury 
compensation reform .” Penny, Review, (197J) 84 Harv. L. Rev. 761, 766 quoted by Ison, “Human 
Disability and Personal Income", New Essays m Canadian Tort Law (ed. Klar 1977) at 425.
*'Some statistics on the decline of the jury trial in civil cases in Canada are to be in the Report of the 
Ontario Law Reform Commission on the Administration o f Ontario Courts, Ministry of the Attorney 
General (1973), part 1 at 331-334.
**Stacey and Kittante J J .. in the trial o f While v. Algoma Steel, Nov. 1st 8c 2nd 1978, Wayne Country 
Circuit Court, Detroit, Michigan.
•’Pearson, supra, at 378.
**Supra, footnote I, at 457-458.
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STREAMLINING AND EXPANDING THE WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION SCHEME
The Commission offers a variety of proposals for simplification 
and improvement o f the compensation system for work injuries and 
diseases. The recommendations are matters of detail rather than 
policy, which is limited to the retention of the employee’s tort action 
against his employer for injury ‘arising out o f and in the course of 
employment’.
On to this new and improved system is to be grafted a no-fault 
scheme for road injuries involving motor vehicles on roads and other 
land to which the public has access.85 The comprehensiveness o f the 
coverage reminds the Canadian reader o f the Quebec no-fault 
scheme which came into effect on the 1st o f March 1978.88 The 
highlights of the road injuries proposals are: similarity of benefits 
between work and road victims; revenue to be collected for road 
injuries through a petrol levy; and the tort action is to remain 
untouched with regard to the burden of proof to be met by the victim. 
The scheme is to be administered by the Department of Health 
and Social Security.
Special recognition is given to victims under the age of twelve 
and of those in receipt of a retirement or widow(er)’s pension. 
The scheme would provide cover to those injured while involved in 
criminal activity but a discretion is given to the Secretary o f State 
for Social Services to discontinue payments where continuation 
would be repugnant to public opinion.
As to who is covered: the benefits are available to all injured 
in the United Kingdom whether or not they are habitually resident 
there, but payments are made to non-residents only during the period 
of their residency in the United Kingdom.87
The Commissioners did not address themselves to the problems 
encountered by the administrators of the New Zealand scheme so that 
their British counterparts will be left to sort out for themselves 
answers to the difficulties raised there.88
"IbuL, at 205 ff.
••The Quebec Automobile Insurance Act (Bill 67, 31st Leg. Que., 2nd session 1977).
•T h is  avoids the panicky reaction o f the rest of Canada and the New England American states to the 
Quebec no-fault scheme which does not cover those visiting or passing through the jurisdiction, ih is 
has implications for the tourist industry.
••Palmer, Accident Compensation m New Zealand: The First Two Years, (1977) 25 Am. J.C.L. 1, at 4-5.
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As for the reaction of the practicing lawyers to the intrusion on 
their bread and butter business, we can but wait and see.89 If the 
North American experience is anything to go by then concerted 
opposition can be expected.90 In Quebec Premier Levesque has found 
it necessary to lecture the Bar on their adverse reactions and reveal 
for them their confusions between public interest and the interests 
of lawyers and their myopic approach to the hierarchy of individual 
and collective rights. Many lawyers fear a drop of up to fifty 
per cent in their earnings, but perhaps they should look abroad to 
the developments in other jurisdictions where it has been suggested 
that there is more than enough work to replace that lost.91
On the other hand trial lawyers in North America have managed 
to hold onto their business through the manipulation of their schemes, 
by the retention of the tort suit as recommended by Pearson, and 
that may be the British experience.
CONCLUSION
What then is the stature of Pearson?92 Will it have the enormous 
impact of the Beveridge Report on Social Insurance93 or the relative 
insignificance o f the Morton Report on Marriage and Divorce;94 
and more selfishly, what guidance can we find in the varied recom­
mendations? With regard to the proposals for reform of the law of 
damages there is not much which is new or which we have not 
already tried for ourselves. What is valuable however is the setting 
out in cold print all of the arguments for and against each possibility. 
The policy considerations are clearly stated at every point. W'hat we 
have then is a sort of compendium of arguments which hopefully 
will facilitate our own decisions on change.
On the much wider issues of extensions o f ‘no-fault’ it must be 
borne in mind in making that assessment that the Pearson Com­
mission could not consider all injuries, and so were precluded from
••In Andrews, Dickson J. had no doubt that the reform  in Britain had been aborted by the combined 
opposition o f ‘insurance interests and the plaintiffs’ bar’, supra, footnote 1, at 458.
••O’Connell, Operation of No-Faull Auto Laws: A Survey of the Surveys, (1977) 56 Neb. L. Rev. 23 at 34.
•'Luntz, Compensation and Rehabilitation: A Survey o f the Report o f the National Committee of 
Inquiry into Compensation and Rehabilitation in Australia and the National Compensation Bill 1974, p. 
134. The author lists: labour law, human rights and civil liberties, consumer affairs and environmental 
protection.
•‘T he Commissions offerings on air transport (chap. 19), waterways (chap. 20), railways (chap. 21), 
animals (chap. 30) are unexceptionable.
••Beveridge Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services (1942), (Cmd. 6404).
•‘Morton Report of the Royal Commission on Mamage and Divorce (1966), (Cmd. 9678).
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making recommendations with regard to compensation for injuries 
in the home; nor could they consider compensation for sickness. 
There could be no recommendation for accident prevention or 
rehabilitation, which many will see as the greatest shortcoming.95 
Nevertheless the overall scheme presented within the Report points 
to how the gradual extension of no-fault to cover all incidents of 
living96 can be achieved. What is proposed is a politically accept­
able compromise which will permit the overall costs to be monitored 
while decisions are made as to greater extensions of the no-fault 
system. Thus at some point after implementation the electorate, 
whether unitary British or provincial Canadian, can decide whether 
or not it desires, and can afford a fully-blown scheme after the Antipodean 
model. Until that time the compensation for injury provided by the 
expanded social security system and the common law of tort in Canada 
and the United Kingdom must live in peaceful co-existence.97
“ Ison, supra, footnote 11.
**Luntz, Compensation and Rehabilitation (1975), at 51 ff. 
•’Linden, supra, footnote 13.
